

AUDIT & GOVERNANCE COMMITTEE

Wednesday, 15 March 2017

OPERATION BARNETT: EAST COAST TIDAL SURGE (REP1544)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. On Friday 13 January 2017 through to the early hours of Saturday morning the East Coast experienced a North Sea tidal surge similar to events in 2007 and 2013. The response of the Suffolk Local Authorities and the Suffolk Resilience Forum (SRF), under the operational name Op BARNETT, has been analysed to understand how we can improve East Suffolk's response and recovery activities.
2. This report outlines the events leading up to and during the tidal surge in January 2017, provides a comparison with the events of 2007 and 2013 and a summary of the key learning points to help improve the Council's response to similar incidents in the future.
3. The Committee is asked to note the key learning points in the report.

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| Is the report Open or Exempt? | Open |
| Wards Affected: | All |
| Cabinet Member: | Councillor Mary Rudd Cabinet Member for Community Health & Safety |
| Supporting Officer: | Phil Gore Head of Environmental Services & Port Health 01435 865333 phil.gore@eastsoffolk.gov.uk |

1 INTRODUCTION

- 1.1 On Friday 13 January 2017 through to the early hours of Saturday morning the East Coast experienced a North Sea tidal surge that threatened the Suffolk coastline and estuaries. The response from the Suffolk Local Authorities, in conjunction with the Suffolk Resilience Forum (SRF) under the operational name Op BARNETT, has been analysed to understand how the Councils' response and recovery activities could be improved to deal with similar incidents in the future.
- 1.2 As well as looking at the events surrounding the January 2017 tidal surge this report includes a comparison with the events in 2007 and 2013 (Appendix A) and a detailed action plan to address the learning points from Op Barnett (Appendix B).

2 EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE

- 2.1 Early warnings from the Environment Agency (EA) Flood Forecasting Centre, received on Monday 9 January 2017, indicated a very low likelihood that the spring high tides might cause minor impacts from Wednesday 11 January through to the end of the week. As a precaution, East Suffolk committed to deploying and constructing the Lowestoft Temporary Flood Barrier (LTFB) on the south bank of Lake Lothing.
- 2.2 An updated EA Flood Guidance Statement (FGS) on Tuesday 10 January indicated a low likelihood of low impacts for Suffolk on Wednesday and very low likelihood of significant impact for the East Coast on Friday. Waveney Norse in conjunction with the Water Management Alliance (WMA) commenced the deployment and construction of the LTFB with complementary media messages from Waveney District Council. The EA held the first of its multi-agency Flood Advisory Service (FAS) teleconferences for the SRF at 1400hrs to discuss the threat from high spring tides combined with adverse meteorological conditions (low pressure) and gale force winds predicted to create large waves and the possible closure of the Orwell Bridge and the Port of Felixstowe. At this stage the SRF did not anticipate any precautionary action, the requirement to establish any emergency response management structures or construct the LTFB on the north side of Lake Lothing.
- 2.3 New flood guidance received on Wednesday 11 January, based on updated modelling, still indicated a low likelihood of low impacts for the evening tide (2030hrs) at Lowestoft. The SRF decided to discuss the possible significant impacts from the adverse weather and tidal surge on Friday morning at the routine meeting at Police Headquarters and joined the FAS teleconference to get the latest updates from the EA. Although confidence in the EA modelling remained low, the 'reasonable worse case' indicated that there were likely to be a number of Severe Flood Warnings issued on Friday and the SRF decided to set-up the Tactical Co-ordinating Group (TCG) at Landmark House on Thursday to assist with contingency planning and to deploy the LTFB to the north bank of Lake Lothing. DCLG also called a Response Coordinating Group (ResCG) teleconference for East Coast LRFs which was attended by Stephen Baker as the SRF Chairman. Construction of the LTFB on the south bank of Lake Lothing was completed at 1900hrs, with monitoring ongoing until the evening tide passed uneventfully. The evening FAS teleconference indicated that the main threat of flooding to the coast of Suffolk had shifted to the evening tide on Friday.
- 2.4 On Thursday 12 January East Suffolk Councils set-up the Emergency Control Centre (ECC) at Waveney District Council Offices at Riverside Road and construction of the remainder of the LTFB commenced at 0800hrs. The latest weather forecast indicated that the threat of the Orwell Bridge closing had receded. EA flood forecasting now moved to

deterministic modelling, based on actual readings, and therefore more accurate and with a higher degree of confidence. Concern now spread over two tides: morning and evening on Friday 13 January with reasonable worst case predictions suggesting that for the morning high tide 19 Flood Warnings would be issued (5 near the severe threshold level) and for the evening high tide 14 Flood Warnings (5 severe warnings covering Lowestoft south through Southwold to Aldeburgh and Snape).

- 2.5 The Tactical Coordinating Group focussed on planning for the reasonable worst case and implications for both morning and evening tides on Friday. East Suffolk opened four Rest Centres on Friday: Brackenbury Sports Centre Felixstowe, Leiston Leisure Centre, Carlton Colville Community Centre and Water Lane Leisure Centre, Lowestoft to accommodate people from the Severe Flood Warning areas that were recommended to evacuate through the EA warning systems, social media and leafleting and door knocking by Suffolk Constabulary. Evacuation details were sent to Community Emergency Planning (CEP) groups in East Suffolk.
- 2.6 The north bank of the Lowestoft Temporary Flood Barrier was completed at 1900hrs with security and monitoring ongoing overnight. With cold weather accompanied by snow showers predicted, Suffolk Highways carried out gritting of Priority 1 routes with both these and the Priority 2 gritted again before the early morning rush hour on 13 January. Suffolk Fire and Rescue Service request national assets including water rescue boats, practical advisors and HV pumps to be held in the Strategic Holding Area at the Orwell Crossing.
- 2.7 On Friday 13 January A 'major incident' was declared by SCG at 0600hrs, the East Suffolk ECC was activated at 0700hrs and transport was provided for the evacuation of residents at Bawdsey and Felixstowe Ferry from 0800hrs. The Rest Centre at Felixstowe was opened at 0800hrs. The EA issued 2 Severe Flood Warnings for the morning high tide and 9 Severe Flood Warnings for the evening high tide across East Suffolk.
- 2.8 The East Suffolk communication officers notified all Councillors and provided updates to residents via traditional and social media. The Suffolk County Council Emergency Control Centre and Helpline were activated from 0800hrs.
- 2.9 Volunteers from the East Suffolk Councils were requested to assist with manning the ECC or Rest Centres for second and subsequent shifts. Mutual aid was requested from Ipswich Borough Council for manpower and Rest Centre equipment. Rest Centres were supplemented by Suffolk County Council volunteers, British Red Cross staff and finally with volunteers from across both councils that offered to assist. The Co-operative provided refreshments and non-perishable food to the Rest Centres.
- 2.10 Leiston Leisure Centre, Carlton Colville Community Centre and Water Lane Leisure Centre, Lowestoft were opened as Local Authority Rest Centres at 1400hrs. Transport to the Rest Centres was provided by SCC Norse from designated rendezvous points: Felixstowe Ferry – Ferry Inn; Snape – Maltings; Lowestoft - Railway Station (N) and South Beach Pavilion car park (S); Southwold – Pier car park; Oulton Broad – Nicholas Everitt park; Aldeburgh – Community Hall.
- 2.11 The inclusion of the EA flood zone Riverside Business Park resulted in East Suffolk and Suffolk County Council reviewing their business continuity plans for Riverside and the Registrars' Office. A decision was made not to relocate the East Suffolk Emergency Control Centre to East Suffolk House at Melton, but all cars were removed from the car park and the emergency generator was run-up and the fuel checked.

- 2.12 In the midst of all the planning for the tidal surge, the Port of Felixstowe closed due to high winds and Operation STACK was implemented for the lorries unable to access the port. Pre-arranged toilet cubicles (portaloos) were requested by Suffolk Coastal District Council and deployed to Levington.
- 2.13 The Rest Centre at Brackenbury, Felixstowe was closed at 1900hrs a decision based on the reduction in threat to Felixstowe Ferry and concerns about Local Authority resource.
- 2.14 Bascule and Mutford Lock Bridges were closed to general traffic at 2000hrs due to the threat from water ingress into the bridge abutments and across the main A12. Access for Emergency Services and LTFB maintenance teams was maintained. The plan was to open the bridges at 2300hrs dependent on information from Bridge Control.
- 2.15 The high water at 2130hrs passed without incidents at Lowestoft, although the water level came within less than 10 cm of topping the quay along the south side of Lake Lothing. Both bridges were opened shortly afterwards.
- 2.16 With the threat from flooding passed, Carlton Colville and Water Lane closed at 2330hrs and evacuees self-returned to their own homes. Leiston remained open until 0200hrs on 14 January 17 to cater for possible flooding at Snape.
- 2.17 The Major Incident was closed at 2359hrs and the Emergency Control Centre closed at 0230hrs on Saturday 14 January. Dismantling, cleaning and repacking of the Lowestoft Temporary Flood Barrier started on the Saturday and was completed on 16 January. The Rest Centre equipment was returned the following week.

3 RECOVERY PHASE

- 3.1 The local authority is the lead agency for the recovery phase and some initial planning for recovery was undertaken at the SCG but fortunately, as there was very little impact from flooding, a full scale recovery phase was not necessary.

4 IMPACTS

- 4.1 There were no deaths or serious injuries as a result of the tidal surge. However, on Saturday 14 January a section of cliff collapsed at Thorpeness resulting in the death of a passing walker and on Wednesday 18 January a large section of cliff (1.5km) collapsed at Pakefield.
- 4.2 There were reports of minor flooding in Oulton Broad at the Wherry pub, at the Harbour Inn in Southwold and Suffolk Fire & Rescue Service rescued a stranded car at the bridge at the junction of the A1084 and B1127 in Southwold. The surge once again breached the shingle beach between Dunwich and Walberswick, flooding the freshwater SSSI marshes and there was significant erosion behind the existing rock armour defences at Kessingland pump station.
- 4.3 The local authority Rest Centres set up at Carlton Colville, Water Lane, Leiston and Brackenbury received 2, 5, 0 and 2 evacuees respectively and the Community Emergency Planning Groups set up facilities at Southwold, Snape and Aldeburgh.

5 KEY AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

- 5.1 An action plan capturing all of the feedback and improvements is attached to this report as Appendix B.
- 5.2 The key areas for improvement identified from the feedback are:

Response and Co-ordination: The formation of the Tactical Co-ordination Group (TCG) at Landmark House (LMH) enabled detailed planning and synchronisation to be undertaken. This allowed the Strategic Co-ordination Group (SCG) at Police Headquarters, Martlesham to focus on providing timely direction and prioritisation of the multi-agency response. This was a key recommendation following the 2013 tidal surge (Op FULSTONE) where the failure to establish the TCG led to ineffective multi-agency co-ordination.

Response Facilities: The location for the TCG at LMH is unsatisfactory. The room is too small for the organisations to work effectively together and its dislocation from Police Silver command makes information sharing and situational awareness difficult. The communications suite is inadequate for the anticipated number of people, placing greater reliance on alternative means of communication. This makes data capture and the record of decisions, a pre-requisite for any inquiry, difficult.

Flood Warnings: The Environment Agency provided a good indication of the likely extent of possible flooding for consideration by the SRF. Unlike 2013, the Flood Zone postcode data which was provided was invaluable for co-ordinating the Police door knocking and delivery of evacuation notices. The effectiveness of the warning could be increased if the postcode data can be shared with voluntary groups and the total number of commercial and residential properties for each Flood Zone included in the data.

Community Volunteers: A number of Community Emergency Planning (CEP) groups activated town or parish response plans, including setting up of village halls / sports clubs as places of refuge. The ability of the Local Authority to utilise this resource through effective communication and additional support was, once again, inadequate. The failure to properly utilise the CEP groups and integrate them into a Local Authority response has resulted in some negative comments.

6 HOW DOES THIS RELATE TO EAST SUFFOLK BUSINESS PLAN?

6.1 The Councils' emergency plans and emergency response arrangements are key to supporting the three main strands of the East Suffolk Business Plan:

Enabling Communities: community engagement and the response provided by Community Emergency Planning Groups is critical to the success of the overall response to an emergency and in reducing the time taken for a community to recover following an incident.

Economic Growth: business preparedness and resilience is key to its ability to recover from an incident and quickly return to business as usual.

Financial Self-Sufficiency: The Council requires robust emergency and business continuity plans to support both the recovery of local communities and also its own services.

7 FINANCIAL AND GOVERNANCE IMPLICATIONS

7.1 The cost of Op Barnett is still being calculated and will include the costs associated with the deployment of the Lowestoft Temporary Flood Protection Barrier which will be shared with the Environment Agency, the costs associated with the mutual aid provided by neighbouring authorities including Ipswich Borough, Mid Suffolk and Babergh and Suffolk County Councils,

any additional costs incurred by our partners Norse and our leisure providers for supporting our rest centre activities.

- 7.2 The Government operate a scheme for the reimbursement of the costs incurred by local authorities responding to emergencies which threaten life. We are currently collating all costs associated with Op Barnett with the intention of making a claim under the Bellwin Scheme as we did following the tidal surge in 2013.

8 OTHER KEY ISSUES

- 8.1 This report has been prepared having taken into account the results of an Equality Impact Assessment, a Sustainability Impact Assessment and a Partnership Impact Assessment.

9 CONSULTATION

- 9.1 The information contained in this report reflects extensive consultation and feedback from all emergency response agencies and voluntary groups (through the SRF), and all staff that were involved in the response whether at the Strategic Coordinating Group, Tactical Coordinating Group, Emergency Control or Rest Centres. Feedback on areas for improvement has also been gathered from Community Emergency Planning Groups and the Councils' service delivery partners.

10 OTHER OPTIONS CONSIDERED

- 10.1 It is good practice to review and amend emergency response and recovery plans and detailed arrangements from the lessons learnt following any incident or exercise.
- 10.2 No other options were considered.

11 REASON FOR RECOMMENDATION

- 11.1 To provide the Committee with reassurance that a robust and effective response was delivered by the Council in response to the tidal surge and that a thorough review has been undertaken to identify areas for improvement.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Committee note the events surrounding the East Coast tidal surge and the Councils' response to the emergency, the lessons learnt and actions proposed.

APPENDICES

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| Appendix A | Comparison of East Coast Tidal Surges - 2007, 2013 and 2017 |
| Appendix B | Operation Barnett – Areas for Improvement Action Plan |

COMPARISON OF EAST COAST TIDAL SURGES – 2007, 2013, 2017

| | 13 Jan 2017 Op BARNETT | 05 Dec 2013 Op FULSTONE | Nov 2007 Op LANDMARK |
|--|--|---|--|
| Warning Period | Early warning > 3 days | Early warning >3 days | Early warning >3 days |
| Confirmed Alert | Confirmed Alert > 1 day | Confirmed Alert >1 day | Confirmed Alert >1 day |
| Severe Flood Warnings | 13 | 14 | 2 |
| Height of flood (Lowestoft) | 2.38m Above Datum at 2155hrs | 3.29m Above Datum at 2230hrs | 2.63m |
| Evacuation | Over 2900 properties | Over 1000 properties | Over 1300 properties |
| Evacuation Centres | 4 Local Authority | 6 Local Authority run 8 Community run | 4 Local Authority run |
| Local Authorities directly involved in response | Suffolk CC Ipswich BC – mutual aid Suffolk Coastal DC Waveney DC Babergh DC - monitoring | Suffolk CC Ipswich BC Suffolk Coastal DC Waveney DC Babergh DC - monitoring | Suffolk CC Ipswich BC Suffolk Coastal DC Waveney DC |
| Properties flooded | Nil | 231 | Nil |
| Of the above, no of businesses flooded | Nil | 117 | Nil |
| Schools Closed | 0 | 4 | 37 |
| Care Homes evacuated | 1 ?? tbc | 1 – Lowestoft | 1 - Aldeburgh |
| No of significant flood defence breaches/overtopping | | 15/2 | 1/1 |
| No of people using all Evacuation Centres | <20 | 193 | <30 |

OP BARNETT – POST EVENT ACTION PLAN

Action plan for East Suffolk following the tidal surge (Op BARNETT) on 13 Jan 17:

| Ser | Observation | Recommendation | Action |
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| Incident Notification/Alerting | | | |
| 1 | No mobile coverage at Brackenbury Leisure Centre, Felixstowe. | Landline available. Include mobile coverage in RC identification and recce process – <i>Already included</i> | JEPU to ensure details included in Rest Centre information. |
| 2 | The LTFB implementation timeline is not understood by SRF telecon participants. | Participation on the SRF teleconference should include a LTFB representative. | Coastal Management |
| Public Warning | | | |
| 3 | Engaging with CEP groups did not occur until the tidal surge information was made public. | Consider engaging the CEP groups with a 'warning order' to allow concurrent planning and confirm contact details. | JEPU to amend JERP to include advanced notification of CEP groups at the point of heightened SRF multi-agency engagement. |
| 4 | The widespread nature of the event meant that engagement with individual CEP groups was problematic. | ECC to co-ordinate engagement with individual CEP group to inform and ascertain plans. ECC Manager should have been activated on Thu 12 Jan 17 to assist with planning. | JEPU to add CEP group details to SRF Alerting Directory. |
| 5 | Sending BCC email (as required under the Freedom of Information) to all CEP groups prevented individuals or groups seeing who else had been notified. | Consider whether e-mail can be sent CEP groups as action addressees to that they can all view distribution. | JEPU to amend JERP to ensure initial e-mail provides indication of those CEP group being considered for activation. |
| 6 | Original e-mail to CEP group did not include information about Local Authority response. | Information to include ECC opening times and contact details. | Initial email to include ECC or D/EPO contact details. CEP group to establish communications with ECC if self-activated. |
| Response Activities | | | |
| 7 | Evacuee pick-up points (PUP) for transport to LA Rest Centres were based on local knowledge or selected from the map. | Vulnerable communities should have pre-designated pick-up points where transport can turn around and wait. | JEPU to include PUP in local flood plans. |
| 8 | LA Rest Centres opened at Brackenbury, Felixstowe (2), Leiston, Carlton Colville (2) and Water Lane, Lowestoft (5): total occupancy in brackets. CEP groups | East Suffolk struggled to resource the 4 x Rest Centres and were heavily dependent on volunteers, other organisations and mutual aid. Given the preference for people not to evacuate | LA are not able to abrogate responsibility and will need to provide 'backstop' LA run Rest Centre(s). CEP groups running Evacuation Centre should be utilised as part of the |

| Ser | Observation | Recommendation | Action |
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| | opened facilities in Southwold, Snape and Aldeburgh. Beccles, Bawdsey and Allerton met to consider opening. | and if they do, to remain local, should the LA resources as many Rest Centres or should they concentrate on assisting the CEP groups? | evacuation plan. Evacuation Centres are to be included in the JERP. |
| 9 | Each LA maintains details of its own Rest Centres in JERP Pt. 4 that were not readily accessible to other LAs or Responders. | Maintain Resilience Direct (RD) Mapping overlay with all LA Rest Centres and address details. - <i>Information already included on RD.</i> | JEPU - complete |
| 10 | Leiston Community Centre lacks some amenities and the staff were unaware of how a Rest Centre operates. | Possible enhancements to all LA owned/run Rest Centres should be considered as part of the East Suffolk refurbishment programme. Leiston Leisure Centre staff to be trained as Rest Centre volunteers. | Upgrading facilities at Leiston Community Centre to be considered as part of LA refurbishment programme. JEPU to train Leisure Centre staff. |
| 11 | Carlton Colville community centre caretaker difficult to contact. | Secondary contact for Carlton Colville. | JEPU in discussion with Carlton Colville town council about possible secondary key holder. |
| 12 | East Suffolk Rest Centre staff were largely unavailable and manning was reliant on an appeal to all staff. | CEO appeal for East Suffolk volunteers should have been made as soon as the number of Rest Centres was known and on declaration of a Major Incident. ECC should consider shift length (8hrs rather than 12hrs) and transport from normal place of work to alleviate staff concerns and prevent lone working. | LA require a more robust system for undertaking CCA responsibilities. This includes: rewarding or financial reimbursing volunteers, seeking additional members of staff; once Major Incident is declared; using Vol Orgs and mutual aid from the outset. To be included in next EP Snr Offrs agenda. |
| 13 | Existing Rest Centre staff could be augmented with Active Communities 'Town Pastor' staff who are DBS and first aid trained. | LA to consider the employment of Town Pastors either as Liaison Officers or to supplement the Rest Centre staff. | JEPU to co-ordinated with SVOG to ensure that organisations (Town Pastors, Plymouth Brethren, Rotarians) are available for support to SRF responders. |
| 14 | Rest Centre equipment had to be out-loaded to the various Rest Centres taking valuable Norse resources. | Consider storing Rest Centre equipment at the larger Local Authority run Rest Centres (Water Lane, Lowestoft and Brackenbury, Felixstowe) to alleviate the requirement to move equipment. | JEPU to discuss with individual Rest Centres to ensure that any available storage is secure. |
| 15 | Rest Centre equipment is not conveniently boxed to allow for the easy movement of a known quantity. This led to confusion about what had been delivered to each Rest Centre and CEP group. | JERP Pt4 to be amended to reflect the quantity of equipment in each box. Boxes to be clearly labelled. | JEPU to consider whether to rebox items into convenient numbers. |

| Ser | Observation | Recommendation | Action |
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| 16 | Rest Centre staff did not update ECC after shift handover. | Ensure RC Managers are aware of requirement to update ECC and notify them at shift change. | JEPU to implement Handover checklist. |
| 17 | Rest Centre feeding arrangements were problematic. East Suffolk considered providing refreshments, but quickly realised that a hot evening meal would be required. Contract with East of England Co-operative via SCC was very responsive, however some of the food delivered was unsuitable – quantity or existing catering facilities. | SCC contract needs to provide better oversight and direction to prevent unsuitable produce being delivered to Rest Centres. [LA should consider purchasing Burco boilers or microwaves to allow larger quantities of water to be heated at Rest Centres]. | LA ECC to generate catering support. JEPU to update Emergency Feeding Arrangements to include suitable food. JEPU to review LA Rest Centre catering arrangements to ensure that a burco boiler and microwave are available. |
| 18 | Lack of awareness of available translations services. | JERP Pt 4 to be updated with details of how to access Language Line / IN TRAN translation services. | JEPU to update JERP Pt4. Include in Rest Centre exercise |
| 19 | Riverside is in 3B3 Flood Zone and when this was included in the Severe Flood Warning there was a debate about relocating the ECC to ESH. | How flood resilient is Riverside? Generator suitable for running ECC for 8-10hrs but only if fully fuelled. What about ducts, air bricks and ability to divert water away from front entrance? | Hd of Operations to investigate flood resilience measures. |
| 20 | Removal of cars from Honda Lings forecourt provided 'car park' for sightseers | Suggest that Honda Lings forecourt should be 'coned off' to prevent public access. | Coastal Management as part of LTFB protocol. |
| 21 | Public car parks in flood zones were not closed. | Consider closure of car parks in flood zones to prevent damage to cars and reduce the number of sightseers. | LA |
| 22 | Struggle to identify volunteers at all levels. | Management Teams to issues notice to staff when Major Incident declared to ensure main effort is support of councils' response and critical tasks, not routine work. | See Ser 12. |
| 23 | The procedure for reimbursement for mutual aid was not well understood by LAs. Issues have arisen post event on the responsibilities (costs) incurred in supporting mutual aid provision | Mutual Aid arrangements need either to be pre-agreed or properly considered during the response. Engage with CEOs and Finance Offrs to ensure that the process is completed | CEO to agree recharging principles following the event. |
| 24 | SCC Registrars planned use of Riverside House was not adequately coordinated regarding use of the building on the following day after closure of the ECC | Ensure ECC close down procedures are appropriately coordinated with Vertas, etc. | SCC responsible for notifying Registrars Office. |

| Ser | Observation | Recommendation | Action |
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| 25 | Messages and emails were directed to JEPU team member's personal mobiles and email accounts | Calls should be directed to ECC contact numbers and where appropriate collective email accounts. Where no possible ensure 'Out of Office' messages are posted after HO/TO to redirect information related to the response. | JEPU to review appropriate communication channels for passing information to the ECC. There are no generic e-mail addresses for SCG/TCG LA representatives and therefore personal e-mail accounts will still be required. |
| Engagement with Strategic Partners (Norse/Sentinel) | | | |
| 26 | Rest Centre equipment box contain different amounts, making the outloading of a specific amount difficult. | Boxes to be clearly labelled with contents and number of items. | See Ser 15. |
| 27 | Norse were unable to access Rest Centre equipment stored at the Lowestoft Police Station. | Lowestoft Police Station has reduced its public opening hours. 24hrs access is still available when the front desk is closed. JERP Pt4 to be amended to include 'when the front desk is closed, press buzzer for connection to Police Headquarters or walk to rear of building to Police only entrance.' Also include Lowestoft Police Sergeant's number xxxxx xxxxxx which is available 24hrs. | JEPU to amend JERP |
| 28 | Norse provided valuable resources to move Rest Centre equipment, but the equipment is not conveniently boxed resulting in unknown quantities being dispatched. | Consider whether it is practical to box Rest Centre equipment in batches of 10: sleeping bags, pillow, mattress. | See Ser 15. |
| 29 | Sentinel supported Rest Centres at Water Lane and Places for People Leisure (PfPL) supported Brackenbury. | Providing Rest Centre training to sports/leisure centre staff was hugely beneficial. | JEPU to train Leiston and Bungay staff to supplement LA Rest Centre volunteers. |
| CEP and Vol Org Engagement | | | |
| 30 | CEP groups (Southwold) that activated asked about public liability insurance. | D/EPO need to be clear about whether the CEP group is activating or whether the LA is requesting activation in response to an incident. Draft 'activation' insurance arrangements to be produced by JEPU. | JEPU to provide standard insurance letter for CEP activation that states what tasks the LA are expecting the CEP group to undertake. LA Legal to advise and trigger point and activating officer to be decided by LA. |

| Ser | Observation | Recommendation | Action |
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| 31 | CEP groups felt that their efforts were not supported by the LA. | Consider whether CEP groups' emergency arrangements, supported by LA where appropriate, should be the first line of widespread major incident response. This would localise evacuation arrangements, increasing the uptake of evacuees and support CEP arrangements. | LA to utilise the CEP groups to provide Evacuation Centres. Evacuation planning to ensure that CEP groups are synchronised with LA arrangements. |
| 32 | Vol Orgs – Plymouth Brethren, Red Cross and Rotary Club – were an invaluable source of Rest Centre support. Unfortunately, the contact details were not easily to hand. | Review East Suffolk contact details to ensure that the local Vol Orgs are made aware of information at an early stage. | See Ser 13. Vol Org contact details to be held centrally and available through the Alerting Directory. |
| 33 | EA postcode data is not available to CEP groups, but for an effective response, they need to know the areas notified for evacuation. | EA to confirm what data can be released. LA to include general information in Flood Response plan. CEP group to be provided map of local flood zone. | EA investigating whether data can be released to CEP groups. JEPU to discuss CEP support to Police during notification and evacuation. |
| 34 | Valuable time and resources were spent providing equipment and bedding to CEP groups. | Consider whether CEP groups in known flood risk areas can be provided basic sets of bedding and equipment – 5 or 10 sets. | JEPU to discuss with CEP groups to ensure that any available storage is secure. |
| 35 | CEP groups expressed concern that all the LA Rest Centres were closed once the threat had passed Lowestoft. | Consult with EA about risks and consider retaining a Rest Centre (Leiston) if flooding possible. | EA decision whether it is safe for evacuees to return to properties in flood zones. |
| 36 | Some CEP groups only have single point of contact. | CEP groups to be encourage to provide three points of contact and then confirm at start of incident which is the primary one. | JEPU to get CEP groups to update plans to include additional contact details. These details to be collated in the Alerting Directory. |
| Command and Control/Decision Making | | | |
| 37 | Decision taken to set-up ECC at Riverside without normal EPO assistance (absent on course). | D/EPOs to peer review JERP Pt. 4 ECC set-up to help familiarise themselves with alternate locations. | JEPU training programme. |
| 38 | The organisation of volunteers into ECC and Rest Centre shifts took considerable time and management. | ECC Manager should have been used on Thu to gather volunteer availability. Once major incident declared, CEO should have published directive to all East Suffolk staff about work priorities and support to response. | See Ser 12. |

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| 39 | Decision making at Riverside was hampered by the lack of nominated Head of Service to act at Tactical Management Team (TMT) and support ECC. | Any major incident that requires LA response will have to consider resourcing issues. TMT needs to be available to resolve issues, particularly manpower (BC issue). | JEPU to implement TMT training for LA T4 managers. |
| 40 | Unless TMT staff are earmarked for an SRF response role they receive no/limited training on EP or BC. | TMT training course to be delivered to all Heads of Service. | See Ser 40. |
| 41 | LTFB staff lack an understanding about SRF response or co-ordinating structures. | TMT training course to be delivered to key LTFB staff. | JEPU to arrange training with Coastal Management. |
| 42 | Lack of whiteboard space at Riverside ECC hampered information gathering. EPO resorted to 'magic whiteboards'. | EPO to confirm requirement for additional whiteboards with shared Estate Manager. | JEPU with shared Estate Manager |
| 43 | The key for the Riverside ECC storage cupboard was not easy to locate. | JERP Pt. 4 to be amended to include key number. | JEPU to obtain additional spare key for key press. |
| 44 | Riverside ECC satellite telephone unserviceable. | Check satellite telephone serviceability. | JEPU - serviceable |
| 45 | Riverside Out of Hours access and refreshment arrangements for staff working overnight needs to be clarified in JERP. | Update JERP Pt4. | LA to consider the use of Vertas to provide catering for ECC and LTFB staff. |
| 46 | ECC staff unsure how to operate RD Mapping and there were no login details. | Additional RD Mapping training for all ECC staff. | JEPU to implement additional training and RD mapping to be included in exercises. |
| 47 | ECC staff unsure where to save information on the computer and were viewing the wrong mailboxes. | Update JERP Pt 4. | JEPU to provide additional training. |
| 48 | Ad hoc arrangements were made for the second (RD Mapping) projector and the cables were too short. | Check equipment and locate new projector. Riverside ECC has projectors x 2 and stand. | JEPU to update JERP Pt4. |
| 49 | Call out information and CEP contact details were unavailable to ECC staff. | Useful numbers and e-mails to be maintained in JEPU Emergency Planning Contacts list. Updated list to be send to ECC by e-mail and available to ECC staff on set-up. | See Ser 36. |
| 50 | During SCG/TCG meetings there was no-one available to answer the LA telephone. | Consider LA logist if space is available at the SCG/TCG. | No solution because of insufficient space. |

| Ser | Observation | Recommendation | Action |
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| 51 | Communication from Local Authority at TCG with SCG, SCC and East Suffolk ECC was via JEPUs members' mobiles. | Reduce reliance on JEPUs individuals and their mobiles through better use of emergency organisations' telephone system. | See Ser 25. |
| 52 | No use of incident logs to record decision making. | Better use of e-mails to confirm telephone conversations and act as Record of Decisions. | See Ser 25. |
| 53 | Information was potentially lost at LA SCG/TCG though lack of detailed notes/rolling brief material | Develop handover/ takeover protocol/checklist for LA Liaison Officers (LOs) | Handover will be dependent on developing situation. |
| 54 | Confusion about LA RD Situation Reports (SITREPs) and whether this is entered by ECC or LA representatives at TCG. | Clarification required. <i>Afternote: LA updates should go into the Agency Report folder. At the appropriate time, key information should be copied to ECC SITREP. LA TCG rep should check information and update as necessary prior to SCG conference.</i> | JEPUs to ensure RD training covers Sitreps. ECC exercises to include the production of Sitreps. JEPUs to approach Police to see whether RD training can be included on TCG course. |
| 55 | Valuable time was spent obtaining log-in details for SCC staff at the SCG/TCG. | RD log-in details for SCC staff should be forwarded once they are nominated for the SCG/TCG appointment. | RD Administrators to send log-in details. See Ser 54. |
| 56 | Catering arrangement for the TCG and East Suffolk ECC were ad hoc. | Refreshment and catering arrangements for the TCG and East Suffolk ECCs requires clarification. | LA to consider feeding arrangements for ECC staff at Riverside or East Suffolk House. |
| 57 | TCG lacked awareness of SRF plan for Flooding, the Lowestoft evacuation plan or knowledge of the Lowestoft Temporary Flood Barrier. | Ensure hard copies are available for the current plan. Revise JERP Pt 2 and develop quick In-briefing sheet for LA LOs including RD, document pointers, etc. | SCG / TCG agenda to be amended to include check of plan. RD Response Page to include key documents and plans relating to the incident. LA SCG/TCG representatives to familiarise themselves with the relevant SRF plan. |
| 58 | SCG/TCG LA Tac Advisors used personal email accounts meaning potential for messages to go adrift after shift handover | Either set up generic email addresses or ensure Out of Hours messages logged by off-going shift in their Mailboxes. | See Ser 25. Mailbox to include 'Out of Office' message at end of shift. |
| Media/Public Information | | | |
| 59 | Confusion whether information went to town/parish councils, as well as District Councillors. | Default setting is that Comms should send information to <u>all</u> councillors (District, town and parish) and clerks. | LA Comms to ensure relevant information is communicated to all councillors. |

| Ser | Observation | Recommendation | Action |
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| 60 | Districts actively used social media to provide feedback (monitoring) and respond to misinformation. | Consider having SCC or District Twitter feed monitored in ECC for improved situational awareness. | JEPU to consider as part of Social Media plan. |
| 61 | Communications Officers were unable to host all the media requests for interviews. | Consider using Cabinet Members to host the media to alleviate the availability of Communications Officers. | LA Comms |
| 62 | There were lots of comments about the use and provision of sandbags on social media. | East Suffolk Comms actively informed people about the LA sandbag policy. They will develop a more proactive message for the web pages including provide links to flood resilience products. | LA Comms produced draft communications plan to complement the East Suffolk Flood Protection policy. |
| 63 | Public continues to be unaware of appropriate flood resilience products for properties. | East Suffolk are producing a publicity campaign and web site information about sandbags and flood resilience products. | See Ser 63. |
| 64 | In the event of flooding there is a requirement for a conspicuous LA presence to demonstrate commitment and provide reassurance. LA staff will require clear instructions about the advice and information available to residents/businesses. | Develop information sheet for inclusion in LA Recovery plans for consistent messaging. | LA Comms produced draft recovery crib sheet for discussion. Final version to be included in SRF Recovery plan. |